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NOTES
property in question, thus making the act of sale by the wife
alone translative of title as a sale of her separate property.
While arguments may be proposed in support of either inter-
pretation, the latter presents a more salutary result. Under that
interpretation the crux of the problem is centered around the
presumption of community property asserted by the plaintiff
and not the actual transfer of the property involved. This avoids
the necessity of an application of the parol evidence rule and
negatives the possibility that the defendant was acquiring prop-
erty by estoppel.
Stephen J. Ledet, Jr.
TORTS - INJURIOUS RELIANCE
Plaintiff was the employee of defendant, who was engaged
in the severance and sale of timber. Defendant, desiring the
protection of compensation insurance, approached X who regu-
larly purchased timber from defendant and who maintained
compensation insurance for his own employees. X proposed, in
good faith, that the cost of insurance premiums be deducted
regularly from the price to be paid for timber purchased from
defendant by X, and assured defendant that the effect would
be to extend the protection of his policy to defendant's em-
ployees. Defendant, relying upon X's representation, made no
further effort to secure compensation coverage. Thereafter
plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment. He
instituted suit for compensation against defendant, X, and X's
insurer. The district court held defendant, X, and X's insurer
liable in solido in tort. On appeal, held, affirmed as to defendant
and reversed as to X and his insurer. However, the court of
appeal, grounding its decision on estoppel, held that X was liable
in damages to defendant,' for whatever amount defendant was
forced to expend toward fulfilling the judgment against him.
One who, with knowledge of the facts, conducts himself so as to
mislead another who relies thereon, is estopped from afterwards
assuming a position inconsistent with his prior position. Car-
penter v. Madden, 90 So.2d 508 (La. App. 1956).
A vendee-vendor relationship between the injured claimant's
employer and the defendant will not support a workmen's cor-
1. The court did not indicate the process by which they allowed defendant to
recover judgment against X, thus leaving a procedural question open; however,
it Is assumed that defendant called X in warranty under Louisiana's Third Party
Practice Act.
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pensation recovery in Louisiana.2 Therefore, in the instant case
plaintiff was precluded from recovering in compensation from
X or his insurer because X was the vendee of defendant.8 Con-
sequently, since X was mistaken as to the effect of his policy,
plaintiff's only hope of obtaining judgment on which he could
realize a recovery rested on defendant's ability to bring a suc-
cessful action against X in tort. Defendant had several possible
theories which he could have argued: to-wit, a gratuitous under-
taking, deceit or misrepresentation, and equitable estoppel.
Generally, under principles of tort, one is not liable for fail-
ing to render aid or assistance gratuitously 4 unless he com-
mences an undertaking to do something of such a nature as to
cause the recipient to rely thereon to his detriment.5 In such a
case the actor is held to a duty of reasonable cares in continuing
2. Smith v. Crossett Lumber Co., 72 So.2d 895 (La. App. 1954); Grant v.
Consolidated Underwriter, 83 So.2d 575 (La. App. 1947), 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 573 (1949) ; Jones v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La.
App. 1939) ; Harris v. Southern Kraft Corp., 183 So. 65 (La. App. 1938) ; West
v. Martin Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 366 (1927); Morrison v. Weber King Mfg.
Co., 6 La. App. 388 (1927); MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 72, 123 (1951) ; Malone, Principal's Liability for Work-
men's Compensation to Employees of Contractor, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REvmW 25,
29-34 (1949).
3. This was, of course, a finding of fact by the court, and the finding would
seem to be completely in line with a long string of strikingly similar lumber cases.
Smith v. Crossett Lumber Co., 72 So.2d 895 (La. App. 1954) ; Grant v. Con-
solidlated Underwriters, 33 So.2d 575 (La. App. 1947). But see Lasyone v. Gross
& Janes Co., 47 So.2d 374 (La. App. 1950) ; Carter v. Colfax Lumber & Creo-
soting Co., 9 La. App. 497, 121 So. 233 (1928); MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 72, 123 (1951) ; Note, 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 573, 575, n. 9 (1949).
4. Union Pac. R.R. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281, 69 L.R.A. 513
(1903) ; Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301, 56 A.L.R. 1123 (1928);
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 38 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 Pac. 459 (1911); Maddock v.
Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 Pac. 12, 12 A.L.R. 216 (1920) ; Sult v. Scandrett, 119
Mont. 570, 178 P.2d 405 (1947) ; Smedes v. Bank, 20 Johns. 372 (N.Y. 1823) ;
2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6 (1956) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS§ 38 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325 (1934) ; Arterburn, Liability for
Breach of Gratuitous Promises, 22 ILL. L. REV. 161 (1927) ; Seavey, Reliance
upon Gratuitous Promise8 or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REV. 913 (1951);
Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 164 (1931).
Until the recent case of Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1957),
18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 584, Louisiana had not had occasion to pass on this
problem from a tort viewpoint, although several cases bad recognized a com-
parable duty in other areas. Hazel v. Williams, 80 So.2d 133 (La. App. 1954);
Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Gorden, 5 La. Ann. 604 (1850); Montillet v.
Bank of United States, 1 Mart(N.S.) 365 (La. 1823); Lafarge v. Morgan, 11
Mart.(O.S.) 462 (La. 1822) ; Durnford v. Patterson, 7 Mart.(O.S.) 460 (La.
1820).
6. Maddock v. Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 Pac. 12, 12 A.L.R. 216 (1920). The
Louisiana courts, in their dealings with gratuitous bailees, have said that the
bailee's standard of care is determined by Articles 1908, 2937, 2938, and 800
of the LOuisiana Civil Code of 1870. Levy v. Pike Brother & Co., 25 La. Ann.
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to act so as not to worsen the condition of the recipient, since
his efforts may have caused the recipient to forego attempting
to assist himself, or have caused another, who might have as-
sisted the one in peril, to assume that the situation had been
remedied. Although there is no set formula for determining
what will constitute such an undertaking,7 the view taken in a
recent Louisiana cases subsequent to the present case9 indicates
that whenever one promises to render assistance to another, the
undertaking is consummated and liability will attach if the re-
lied-upon undertaking is negligently performed. Thus an ex-
ample of an undertaking would be the case where A receives
life insurance premiums from B and gratuitously agrees to for-
ward them to the insurance company when he sends in his own
premiums. In such a case A, upon receipt of the premiums, has
clearly undertaken the duty to use reasonable care in seeing
that they are duly sent on to the company. Should he negligently
or intentionally fail to send in the premiums, thus causing the
policy to lapse, he will be liable to B's heirs for the beneficial
amount under the policy if B died believing that the insurance
premiums had been paid to the company.' 0
The difficulty in the application of this idea in the present
situation lies in the fact that X did not undertake or promise
to perform any act for the defendant. If X had assured defend-
ant that he would procure insurance for him and had failed to
do so, the right of recovery would be fairly clear."
Another possible basis on which the case might have been
630 (1873) (Article 2937) ; Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Gorden, 5 La.
Ann. 604 (1850) (Article 3003).
7. The older cases, lead by Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809), held
that an undertaking began only when some action was taken toward the actual
assistance of another, and mere promises of aid would not constitute an under-
taking regardless of the reliance. However, in attempting to retain this old non-
feasance formula, courts have confused the problem by finding extremely trivial
acts on which the plaintiff could have relied, thus constituting actionable mis-
feasance. Carr v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 502, 102 Atl. 532 (1917) (ac-
cepting a piece of paper). See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 38 (2d ed. 1955);
Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV.
913 (1951); Note, 45 HAxv. L. REV. 164 (1931); Note, 18 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEW 584 (1958).
8. Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1957), 18 LOUISANA LAW
REvIEw 584, would certainly indicate the trend in Louisiana. See RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 378 (1933) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325 (1934) ; Arterburn, Liability
for Breach of Gratuitous Promises, 22 ILL. L. REV. 161 (1927) ; Seavey, Reliance
upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951);
Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 164 (1931). Contra, PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 185-86
(2d ed. 1955).
9. See note 8 supra.
10. Maddock v. Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 Pac. 12 (1920).
11. Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1957). See note 7 supra.
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argued is that of deceit or misrepresentation. Deceit principles
impose liability upon one who knowingly misleads another so as
to gain some benefit over him. 12 Derived from deceit principles,
the theory of negligent misrepresentation's provides that by
reason of his position, one may fall under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to insure the accuracy and validity of his asser-
tions. Also stemming from deceit, innocent misrepresentation 14
provides that one is liable for an incorrect statement which he
believed to be true and made as of his own knowledge to be so.
Thus it would appear that defendant, in the instant case, could
have successfully argued misrepresentation, because he relied
on the assertion by X as to the legal effect of the policy. How-
ever, an obstacle to the use of misrepresentation as the basis
of the cause of action is that the present case seems to contain
an honestly made misrepresentation of law, and misrepresenta-
tions of law are generally accorded the same treatment as opin-
ions and are therefore non-actionable 5 because they cannot be
justifiably relied upon. But the trend seems to be away from
this rule, 16 especially when there is a decided disparity between
the parties. 7 The present case seems to be subject to the ex-
ception or modern trend in that there was certainly a vast dif-
12. The idea that "scienter" or fraudulent intent is requisite to form a basis
for an action in deceit comes from Derry v. Peck, 14 A.C. 337, 58 L.J. 864 (Ch.
1889), and although rejected in many United States jurisdictions still appears to
be the majority general rule. See HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 7.1,
7.3, 7.5 (1956); PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 88 (2d ed. 1955). Louisiana seems
to have adopted the rule that "scienter" is required. In Montilly v. His Creditors,
18 La. 383 (1841), the court said: "In order to constitute a fraud, two conditions
are legally necessary : there must be the intention of defrauding, consilium fraudis,
and the event or the effective and actual loss sustained by the creditors, eventus
damni; if one of these requisites does not exist, there is no fraud." Buxton v.
McKendrick, 223 La. 62, 64 So.2d 844 (1953) ; Swain v. Lindsay, 85 So.2d 360
(La. App. 1956).
13. But see Beyer v. Estopinal, 224 La. 516, 70 So.2d 109 (1954) ; Tardos V.
Bozant, 1 La. Ann. 199 (1846); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E.
275, 23 A.L.R. 1425 (1923) ; Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888) ;
HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.6 (1956); PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 88 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 552 (1934) ; Green, Deceit, 16 VA.
L. REV. 749 (1930).
14. Lerner v. Riverside Citrus Ass'n, 115 Cal. App.2d 544, 252 P.2d 744
(1953); Scholossman's, Inc. v. Niewinski, 12 N.J. Super. 500, 79 A.2d 870
(1951); HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.7 (1956) ; PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS §88 (2d ed. 1955).
15. Furman v. Keith, 226 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Gormely v.
Gymnastic Ass'n, 55 Wis. 350, 13 N.W. 242 (1882). In reaching this conclusion,
some courts hold that everyone is presumed to know the law. Smith v. Brown, 59
Cal. App.2d 836, 140 P.2d 86 (1943).
16. Peterson v. First Nat. Bank, 162 Minn. 369, 203 N.W. 53, 42 A.L.R.
1185 (1925) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 559-60 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 545 (1934).
17. Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Line, 183 F.2d 548, 21 A.L.R.2d
266 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Rice v. Press, 117 Vt. 442, 94 A.2d 397 (1953).
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ference in the capacities of the parties. X was a man experi-
enced in such matters as taking out insurance and other busi-
ness transactions, while defendant was a mere novice, to say
the least, in engaging in independent operations and obtaining
insurance. Further, the close vendee-vendor relationship be-
tween the parties would lend itself to trust and reliance. 8 Then,
too, the confusion relative to the amount of damages that may
be recovered under an action for misrepresentation presents a
practical obstacle in the choice of this action.19 Some jurisdic-
tions adhere to the "out-of-pocket" damage theory which would
mean that here the recovery would be limited to the return of
the premiums withheld by X from his payments to defendant.
The other damage rule, the "benefit-of-bargain" rule, allows full
recovery under the bargain which here would mean the amount
recoverable from defendant by plaintiff in compensation. How-
ever, it is believed that the Louisiana courts will follow the
"benefit-of-bargain" rule in cases similar to the present case
where the damages under this rule are easily ascertainable and
the "out-of-pocket" damages would be wholly inadequate. 20 Thus
misrepresentation remains available to defendant as a practical
matter.
The necessity of discussing these possible remedies in the
instant case was avoided by basing the decision on the "con-
venient catch-all" 21 doctrine of equitable estoppel. Use of the
18. Fawcett v. Sun Life Assur Co. of Canada, 135 F.2d 544, 153 A.L.R. 533
(10th Cir. 1943) ; Rice v. Press, 117 Vt. 442, 94 A.2d 397 (1953).
19. The "out-of-pocket" rule is in effect a rule of restitution which holds that
the victim of the deceit may recover the amount that he has paid out because of
the deception. Hancock v. Williams, 99 Cal. App.2d 80, 221 P.2d 129 (1950)
Liebell v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 280 App. Div. 824, 113 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1952).
The "loss-of-bargain," "benefit-of-bargain," or "warranty" rule holds that
damages will be assessed so as to give the plaintiff the position that he would
have occupied had the representations been true. Sposato v. Heggs, 123 Colo. 533,
233 P.2d 385 (1951); National Shawmut Bank v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 58
N.E.2d 849 (1945). In general, see HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.15
(1956) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 91 (2d ed. 1955).
20. The present case does not fall squarely within the classical reasons for
these distinctions in the measure of damages, for the problem usually arises where
a sale is involved. And probably one major reason for a jurisdiction choosing the
"out-of-pocket" rule is the difficulty in determining what is the amount recover-
able under the "loss-of-bargain" rule. But as is stated in a recent Oregon case,
Selman v. Shirley, 161 Ore. 582, 85 P.2d 384, 91 P.2d 312 (1938), where the
damages under the "benefit-of-bargain" rule can be proved with reasonable cer-
tainty, it should be used. Louisiana in at least one case, Tardos v. Bozant, 1
La. Ann. 199 (1846), has seemingly applied the "benefit-of-bargain" rule to a
situation similar to the instant one.
21. Prosser, Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance, 3 U. CI. L.
REV. 39, 47 (1935). Estoppel has also been referred to as "that haven of refuge
of the perplexed jurist" by Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on
Applications, 75 PA. L. REV. 207, 223 (1927).
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estoppel doctrine presents some difficulty, as the underlying
theory of estoppel is that a man is estopped from denying his
prior position to the detriment of another.2 2 In this case it would
mean that X was estopped from denying that his compensation
insurance covered defendant's employees. This, of course, would
not bind the insurer, and since X never represented that he was
subjecting himself to personal liability, so that he could be
estopped from so denying, X would seem not to be liable under
estoppel. However, had defendant argued misrepresentation, it
would seem that a cause of action had been stated. Therefore, it
is submitted that misrepresentation would have been a more
satisfactory basis for the instant decision, in view of the fact
that "estoppels are not favored in law ' '2 3 and are supposed to be
used only when there is no other means of affording justice.2 4
Ray Carlton Muirhead
TORTS - MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
The widow of deceased sued defendant municipality for the
wrongful death of her helplessly intoxicated husband who suffo-
cated from smoke after being locked in jail and left alone. The
trial court denied recovery by applying the doctrine of municipal
tort immunity. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, held,
reversed. A municipality has no immunity from liability in a
tort action when a person suffers a direct personal injury proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee who is
acting within the scope of his employment. However, the im-
munity still exists in legislative and judicial functions.' Har-
grove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
The general rule is that municipalities are immune from
22. "'Estoppe' cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence the English
word stopped; and it is called an estoppel, or conclusion, because a man's own
act or acceptance, stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to alleage or plead the truth."
CoKE'S INSTITUTES 352a. See Reynolds v. St. John's Grand Lodge, A.F. & A.M.,
171 La. 395, 131 So. 186 (1930) ; Lewis v. King, 157 La. 718, 103 So. 19 (1925) ;
Patorno v. Villio, 9 Orl. App. 104 (1912) ; Lichtentag v. Feitel, 1 Orl. App. 172
(La. App. 1904) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 529-30 (2d ed. 1955).
23. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So.2d 202
(1952) ; Carpenter v. Madden, 90 So.2d 508, 514 (La. App. 1956).
24. Estoppel is an equitable remedy. Glover v. Southern Cities Distributing
Co., 142 So. 289 (La. App. 1932). Therefore estoppel must bow to the equitable
rule that a complete and adequate legal remedy excludes equitable remedies.
Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119 (1892).
1. The judiciary and the legislature have always been accorded immunity from
tort liability because of the desire to preserve their independence. See PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS 780, § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
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